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Abstract
In the last decade, Social Networks (SNs) have deeply changed many aspects of
society, and one of the most widespread behaviours is the sharing of pictures.
However, malicious users often exploit shared pictures to create fake profiles
leading to the growth of cybercrime. Thus, keeping in mind this scenario, au-
thorship attribution and verification through image watermarking techniques
are becoming more and more important. In this paper, firstly, we investigate
how 13 most popular SNs treat the uploaded pictures, in order to identify a
possible implementation of image watermarking techniques by respective SNs.
Secondly, on these 13 SNs, we test the robustness of several image watermarking
algorithms. Finally, we verify whether a method based on the Photo-Response
Non-Uniformity (PRNU) technique can be successfully used as a watermarking
approach for authorship attribution and verification of pictures on SNs. The
proposed method is robust enough in spite of the fact that the pictures get
downgraded during the uploading process by SNs. The results of our analy-
sis on a real dataset of 8,400 pictures show that the proposed method is more
effective than other watermarking techniques and can help to address serious
questions about privacy and security on SNs.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, various Social Networks (SNs) have been introduced in or-
der to cater different needs of the users: social interactions (Facebook), profes-
sional interconnections (LinkedIn), photo sharing (Instagram), instant messag-
ing (WhatsApp), to name a few. An important reason for the huge popularity
of social platforms among users is the increase in usage of smartphones, which
in turn has introduced changes in the user habits with respect to multimedia
content on SNs [1]. In particular, some social platforms are predominantly used
through mobile devices, such as Instagram and WhatsApp.
On the flip side, the illicit actions across these SNs are constantly grow-
ing, such as illegal copying, identity impersonation and pedopornography [2].
In particular, fake profiles creation is an important problem across these SNs,
which have seen a sharp increase in recent times [3]. In fake profiles which are
also known as impersonating profiles, a malicious user copies images from other
profile and claims to be the person in that profile pictures. A natural solu-
tion to hinder the process of fake profile creation is by encouraging authorship
attribution and verification through the images.
Broadly, two techniques, namely watermarking and steganography, tech-
niques belonging to information hiding, are used for embedding messages in
digital content [4]. Watermarking is the practice of imperceptibly altering digital
content to embed a mark. Watermarking is the most commonly used technique
for owner identification, proof of ownership, authorship attribution and verifi-
cation [4] and it is generally used in the domain of digital copyright protection
[5]. The crux of the idea is to embed an invisible payload (i.e., the mark) into
the digital content helping users in proving their ownership and, subsequently,
avoiding privacy violations of the shared media. Whereas steganography is the
practice of undetectably altering digital content to embed a secret message.
Since steganography techniques can be used with a mark, and not only with
a secret message, we refer to watermarking approaches both for conventional
watermarking and steganography, throughout this work.
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1.1. Problem Statement
In this study, the scope of digital content is limited to the images, since
image sharing is the most commonly observed behaviour on SNs. In particular,
this work explores the possibility of watermarking the images being uploaded
on SNs, and answers to the following three questions:
1. Social Network Watermarking - Are SNs watermarking our images?
In Section 5, we present the results of our experiments to understand
whether SNs mark the images being uploaded on the social platforms. Our
findings revealed that in general SNs do not perform any watermarking
techniques on images. Out of all the 13 SNs being analysed, we found
out that only Facebook changes to some extent some of the metadata
associated with images. We performed extensive tests in order to verify if
these changes can be imputed to a watermarking function.
2. User Explicit Watermarking - Can conventional watermarking tech-
niques pass through SNs unaffected?
In Section 6, we explore various watermarking algorithms as a tool for
reliable marking the images to be uploaded on SNs. From the analysis,
we found out that there is not a single watermarking technique that can
be successfully used across all the selected SNs.
3. User Unaware Watermarking - Are we unawarely watermarking our
images?
By taking inspiration from previous works where researchers exploited
sensor imperfections to extract the fingerprint to identify a smartphone
[6], [7], [8], we analysed if the camera of smartphones, through which the
images have been taken, can be used for creating a watermark. According
to conventional watermarking literature [4], the proposed method is invis-
ible and detectable and belongs to fragile and blind categories (see Section
2). In practice, the fingerprint of the smartphone camera can be extracted
by the images without altering the device. In Section 7, we provide more
details about our method. We demonstrate that the proposed method is
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robust enough despite the uploading and downloading process of the SNs
that downgrades the shared images.
1.2. Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the
use of several image watermarking approaches on 13 SNs. The results of our
analysis showed that no profile-dependent watermark operations are performed
by SNs. Our study also reveals that conventional watermarking techniques can
only pass unaffected through a subset of the SNs being considered in this study.
The most important finding of this study is that even if the author of the
image does not consciously perform any user explicit watermarking technique,
the smartphone camera still embeds its characteristic fingerprint in every taken
picture. Likewise to conventional watermarking approach, the method allows
to identify the rightful owner of the images and can be successfully applied in
all the 13 considered SNs. Figure 1 shows users’ smartphones and two different
SNs where users shared images taken from their smartphones. We used the
fingerprints left by the smartphone’s camera to deal with the following problems:
1. Profile Attribution - the task to match, through a set of shared images,
a user profile to the right smartphone within a set of devices, case (a) in
Figure 1.
2. Intra-layer User Profiles Linking - the task to decide if a restricted set
of user profiles, within the same SN, belong to the same user, case (b) in
Figure 1.
3. Inter-layer User Profiles Linking - likewise to the previous one, this task
tries to match user profiles that belong to different SNs, case (c) in Figure
1.
4. Fake Profiles Detection - the task to identify unauthorized clone of user
profiles. This task is a corollary of all the previous tasks since an un-
trusted/fake profile can be linked to a verified one using the shared im-
ages.
4
Figure 1: User unaware watermarking’s three main tasks: profile attribution (a), intra-layer
user profiles linking (b), and inter-layer user profiles linking (c).
It is noteworthy that the two types of user profiles linking tasks described
above are not always possible to achieve by using conventional watermarking
techniques since in some cases it is necessary to have original the image to ex-
tract the watermark. The proposed method is robust enough in spite of the fact
that the images get downgraded during the uploading and downloading pro-
cess on the SNs. Moreover, it is possible to address the authorship attribution
and verification in SNs without having the original images or altering the device.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide
a brief background in watermarking techniques. Section 3 presents literature on
three different domains, that is image watermarking, smartphone fingerprinting
and user profiles linking in SNs. The SNs used in our work are briefly described
in Section 4. The investigation activities regarding possible built-in watermark-
ing techniques adopted by SNs are presented in Section 5. In Section 6, user
explicit watermarking techniques on SNs are discussed, and our methodology
for user unaware watermarking is presented in Section 7. Concluding remarks
are made in Section 8.
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2. Background in Watermarking
Depending on the digital contents, different watermarking techniques are
used: syntactic, semantic, and structural transformation for text [9]; domain
transformation for images [10] and video [11]. In accordance with the literature
[4], watermarking methods can be categorized as follows:
• Readable or Detectable - If the user can read the watermark it is called
readable, while if the user can only check whether the watermark is em-
bedded or not, it is called detectable.
• Visible or Invisible - A visible watermarking is visually perceptible by the
user.
• Blind or Non-Blind - The watermarking is blind if the extraction process
does not need the original non-marked digital content.
• Zero Watermarking - The embedding process does not modify the digital
content and exploits its characteristics.
• Simple or Multiple - A multiple watermarking can be applied more than
one time without affecting the previous watermark embedding steps.
• Fragile, Semi-Fragile, Robust - A fragile watermarking can be altered or
erased and it is used for integrity authentication. A robust watermarking
cannot be easily erased and is most suitable for copyright protection, while
semi-fragile watermarking is suited for content authentication.
The following features are usually required for watermarking methods [12]:
• Robustness is the ability to resist to processing operations and attacks.
• Imperceptibility represents the ability to be detected through special pro-
cessing of watermark detector.
• Security is the capacity to not be altered or removed without having full
knowledge of the watermarking algorithm.
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• Data Payload denotes the maximum number of extra information that can
be embedded in the digital content.
• Computational Cost is the cost required in the embedding and extraction
process.
• Non-inevitability represents the possibility to not extract a watermark
from a non-marked digital content.
All this categorization can also be applied to image watermarking techniques.
3. Related Works
In this section, we describe literature from three domains, all relevant for a
full comprehension of our work. Firstly, we focus on conventional image water-
marking techniques in SNs. Next, we present various approaches for uniquely
identifying smartphones. Finally, we explain methods for associating user pro-
files in SNs, which is the main outcome of this work.
3.1. Image Watermarking in Social Networks
Image watermarking techniques embed a mark in a visually imperceptible
way for authentication and copyright protection tasks [13]. According to the
embedding domain [10], these techniques can be classified in spatial and trans-
form domain watermarking.
The methods in spatial domain watermarking class directly modify the image
pixel acting on the bit value. The simplest approach embeds the watermark
in the Least Significant Bits (LSB) [14]. Intermediate Significant Bit (ISB)
[15] improves the LSB method and defines the watermarked location accord-
ing to the range of each bit-plane. Patchwork [16] is another spatial domain
approach where the watermark is embedded into the image by changing the
pixels’ brightness. In general, the simple implementation of the spatial domain
methods implies less robustness to affine transformations and image processing
attacks [17].
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The methods in transform domain watermarking class apply a transformation
to the original image and exploit the transformed coefficients to embed the
watermark. There are four main techniques in transform domain: Discrete Co-
sine Transform (DCT), Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT), Discrete Fourier
Transform (DFT), and Singular Value Decomposition (SVD). Typically, DCT
algorithms segment the image into blocks and modify a set of selected coef-
ficients [18]. Similarly, in DWT techniques the original image is decomposed
into three spatial directions (i.e., horizontal, vertical, and diagonal), then the
watermark is embedded in the wavelet coefficients [19]. DWT algorithms are
computationally efficient and the visual artefacts introduced are less evident
compared to DCT. The DFT algorithms employ the Fourier transform since it
offers robustness against geometric attacks [20]. DFT decomposes the original
image in phase and magnitude representation. Then, the mark is embedded into
the magnitude representation. SVD is one of the most powerful numeric anal-
ysis techniques [21]. In particular, SVD allows embedding of the mark into the
singular matrix of the frequency domain or spatial domain coefficients with very
less loss of information [22]. Moreover, in order to exploit the various properties,
SVD is combined with the other techniques: DWT-SDV [23], DFT-SVD [24],
and DWT-DFT-SVD [25]. Since the transform domain methods lead to robust
watermarking [26], in our tests we used methods that belong to the transform
domain watermarking class.
Recently, researchers investigated various watermarking techniques to be used in
SNs and also the potential attacks and corresponding solutions [27]. In [28], the
researchers proposed a dual watermarking scheme for Facebook and Google+
by partially redesigning the SN uploading service which may not be feasible.
In [29] authors considered Facebook as a closed system and tested different
steganography methods. A watermarking method based on wavelet decompo-
sition proposed in [30] was successfully tested by simulating different attacks
that can be performed on SNs. In [31] the authors proposed a method based on
DWT coefficients, however, the tests were performed on images with low resolu-
tion that are not compressed during the uploading process on the selected four
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SNs. Similarly, in [32] a method based on DCT transformation was proposed
for Facebook using images that the SN does not resize. A method based on
backpropagation neural network was proposed in [33], however, the authors did
not perform any test on real SNs and used the images with very low resolution
in comparison to the resolution of current smartphone cameras. An orthogonal
approach was presented in [34], where the author proposed to use SN hashtags
(i.e., labels containing a word starting with the “#” symbol) to hide informa-
tion through the images uploaded on Twitter and Instagram. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work where images with high resolution and thirteen
SNs are used to investigate image watermarking techniques in SNs.
3.2. Fingerprinting the Smartphone Devices
Smartphones are becoming more and more pervasive in daily activities.
Recently, researchers proposed methods for identifying and fingerprinting the
smartphone by exploiting personalized configurations [35], touchscreen interac-
tion [36], and on-board camera [37]. Today the smartphones are equipped with a
bunch of sensors. These sensors are produced according to industrial standards,
which makes them ideally identical, however, each sensor has an imperfection
that makes it unique and identifiable [38]. Microphones and speakers, through
playback and recording of audio samples, were exploited in [8]. In [6] the au-
thors proposed a technique using the integrated accelerometers for identifying
mobile phones. An improvement compared to [6] was proposed in [7], where the
authors combined speakerphone-microphone along with the accelerometer.
Among all the sensors described above, the most investigated sensor in the field
of digital forensic is camera [39]. The reason is that the camera offers several
components inside it which can be used to identify the source camera. The chro-
matic aberration introduced by the lens was exploited in [40] whereas in [41] the
camera identification was achieved through the colour filter array (CFA), that
can also be used to recognize a counterfeit image in [42]. In [43] the authors
proposed a sensor-based method exploiting the Photo-Response Non-Uniformity
(PRNU) for successfully distinguishing cameras of the same model. A PRNU-
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based method able to operate with different image sizes was presented in [44].
In [45], Castiglione et al. classified all the various changes made by the SNs
on uploaded images, that commonly causes a loss of effectiveness of the cam-
era fingerprinting methods. Later in [46], they demonstrated the robustness
of the PRNU-based method on the images downloaded from 6 SNs and online
photo-sharing platforms. Since the effectiveness of PRNU-based approach has
been widely demonstrated in [47], including on large scale image dataset [48],
we decided to use it for source camera fingerprinting on SNs.
3.3. User Profiles Linking in Social Networks
Trust is a fundamental ingredient in SNs [49] and a significant increase in
the number of impersonating fake profiles has given rise to various solutions for
deciding whether a given user profile is an unauthorized clone of another one
[50]. In [51], the authors proposed a three layered tool for Facebook which was
able to i) identify suspicious users, ii) expand basic privacy settings, iii) warn
the user against malicious applications. Similarly, a graph-based framework for
detecting fake profile attacks was proposed in [52].
The more generic user profile linking task allows matching different user pro-
files belonging to the same user, which is analogous to missing data problem
in multilayer networks [53]. An invasive and device-dependent solution exploits
the log information stored on the device’s internal memory during the use of
the SNs’ application [54]. The more effective solutions for user profile linking
exploit the information and multimedia contents that transit on SNs. A frame-
work for user profile linking, based on the profile’s attributes, was proposed
in [55]. While in [56] the authors combined tags and user ID to match users’
profile across social tagging systems, the solutions proposed in [57] and [58]
match user profiles by using information about users’ identities without com-
promising their privacy. In [59], the authors presented a method that combines
profile attributes and social linkage to outperform common attribute-based ap-
proach, whereas in [60] network attributes and profile attributes were combined
to improve a traditional identity search algorithms. A weighted ontology-based
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user profile linking technique was proposed in [61]. In order to improve the
performance of the attribute-based approach proposed in [62] and [63] the au-
thors proposed machine learning techniques for matching user profiles across
multiple SNs. Typically, these approaches fail if the malicious user falsifies the
information stored into the fake profile, as it usually happens.
4. Experimental Settings
In this section, we describe the social networks and the images’ characteris-
tics that were used in our analysis.
4.1. Social Networks
Thirteen most popular SNs shown in Table 1 were used for our investigation.
The selection of these SNs was based on two different criteria: the number of
user accounts and the different features offered by these social platform. All
the selected SNs in total count more than 100 million users and cover different
needs, like social interactions (Facebook), photo sharing (Instagram), blogging
(Tumblr), instant messaging (WhatsApp) to name a few. Moreover, we decided
to include SNs developed outside the United States and European Union, like
Telegram, VK (originally VKontakte), and WeChat. Since we are interested in
image watermarking algorithms, in Table 1, we also specify the default pixel
resolution accepted by each social platform.
4.2. Images’ Characteristics
All the SNs accept Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG or JPG) im-
ages with standard pixel resolution, that is default image sizes (see Column III
in Table 1), beyond which the image is automatically scaled to the default reso-
lution. For this reason, we carried out tests for social network watermarking and
user explicit watermarking with three different resolutions: the standard, that
matches the images sizes of the SN; the larger than the standard (4128×2322)
and smaller than the standard (640×480). We used 10 different images for each
resolution class: standard, large, and small. Moreover, both in social network
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Table 1: Social Networks used for the investigations activities and the default pixel resolution
accepted by each platform.
ID Social Networks Image sizes
SN01 Facebook 2048×1152
SN02 Flickr 2048×1152
SN03 Google+ 2048×1152
SN04 Instagram 1080×1080
SN05 LinkedIn 2048×1152
SN06 Pinterest 2048×1152
SN07 Telegram 1280×720
SN08 Tumblr 1280×720
SN09 Twitter 2048×1152
SN10 Viber 1280×720
SN11 VK 2560×1440
SN12 WeChat 1280×720
SN13 WhatsApp 1600×1200
watermarking and in user explicit watermarking, we created two different user
profiles for each of the SNs (i.e., P1 and P2). This had twofold advantages.
Firstly, it allowed us to compare the original image with the downloaded one,
that is “Original vs Shared” case. Secondly, we were able to compare the same
image being uploaded twice on two different user profiles, that is “Shared P1
vs Shared P2” case. In user unaware watermarking, we used a real dataset of
8,400 pictures collected using 6 different smartphones and for each smartphone,
a different user profile on each SN was created (for more details see Section 7).
5. Social Networks Watermarking
The first direction of investigation is about Are SNs watermarking our im-
ages? The context of watermarking can be broadened in terms of changes
performed by a particular SN, such as different name and metadata associated
with the image after being uploaded on the SN. Thus, different comparisons can
be performed among uploaded and downloaded images. Firstly, we performed
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some preliminary analysis about the compression of the images. Next, we com-
pared names, contents (i.e., the image without metadata), and metadata of the
uploaded and downloaded images on each SN. Finally, we executed some extra
analysis on Facebook metadata, including the Content Delivery Network (CDN)
that is an intermediate layer of proxy servers distributed globally. Typically, a
CDN is widely used by high traffic websites, since it allows to provide digital
content with high availability and performance. In the following subsections,
we describe all the tests about social networks watermarking.
5.1. Preliminary Analysis
We observed that when an image is uploaded to a SN, it is compressed
by the JPG compression algorithm adopted by the platform for preserving the
good quality of the image. The compression is due to an optimization of the
image made by the SN. In particular, the quantization matrix coefficients in
the JPG compression algorithm control the compression ratio. This means that
any uploaded image may incur different file sizes, compared to the original, after
downloading. To the best of our knowledge, SNs do not publish any informa-
tion about the image processing algorithms being used inside their platform and
thus for us, they are like a “black box”. For this reason, we investigated the be-
haviour of the selected SNs for particular compression algorithms by describing
the outcomes of our analysis. Table 2 provides information about the average
compression results for each SNs and each resolution class, namely standard,
large (4128×2322), and small (640×480).
Our findings pointed that for each resolution class, Flickr and Google+ do
not apply any compression and preserve the original image size. On an average,
VK applies a very low compression to standard images and all remaining ten
SNs compress the standard images more than 54.34%, on an average. Generally,
large resolution images are strongly compressed by all SNs (except Flickr and
Google+), that is in the range of 67% to 96% and the pixel resolution drops
to default one (see Table 1). It is interesting to note that Viber reduces the
compression rate for images with low resolution turning the JPG quality from
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Table 2: Average compression results obtained from each Social Networks and each resolution
class.
Social Networks Standard Large Small
Facebook 66.54% 91.30% 76.25%
Flickr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Google+ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Instagram 31.94% 94.14% 64.32%
LinkedIn 68.12% 67.39% 74.94%
Pinterest 46.04% 83.82% 52.96%
Telegram 62.91% 95.55% 70.32%
Tumblr 30.42% 82.83% 35.37%
Twitter 53.27% 88.41% 57.12%
Viber 59.72% 94.50% -46.50%
VK 2.33% 79.17% 62.43%
WeChat 65.97% 96.07% 55.97%
WhatsApp 58.49% 93.60% 70.59%
96 to 100, which resulted in a negative value of -46.50%. In only four cases the
pixel resolution does not match the default size in Table 1 (Column III): Insta-
gram, Pinterest, Tumblr and WhatsApp large images were scaled to 1350×1080,
2064×1161, 1920×1080, and 1600×900, respectively.
5.2. Images Comparison
In this section, we present results of four different kinds of comparison on
images before and after uploading of images on SNs to investigate if these SNs
perform any watermarking activity on the uploaded (shared) images.
• Name comparison - This test allowed us to understand if SNs change the
name of the uploaded images.
• Full comparison - The full comparison was performed by exploiting the
Secure Hash Algorithm version 1 (SHA-1), to find the difference between
pair of images. SHA-1 takes an image as input and produces a unique
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160-bit message digest. Any change in content and metadata of the image
implies a different digest in output.
• Content comparison - This test was performed by using a bit by bit com-
parison of the image’s content excluding the image’s metadata. The test
compared two images in binary representation highlighting the differences
between pixels.
• Metadata comparison - Metadata is defined as the data providing extra
information about one or more aspects of the file. The images’ metadata
is specified by the Exchangeable image file format (Exif) standard that
includes information like time, location, camera settings, descriptions, and
copyright information.
Firstly, the 30 images for each resolution class described in Section 4 were up-
loaded and downloaded on both P1 and P2 profiles on each SNs. Then, for
each SN, we performed two different kinds of test. In the first one, we compared
the original images with the downloaded one, “Original vs Shared” case. In the
second test, we compared the shared images on different profiles, “Shared P1
vs Shared P2” case. We wanted to examine for any SN, whether the changes
reverberate in the same way across different profiles or it is unique for each
profile. In the following subsections, we present the results for each of the four
kinds of comparison.
5.2.1. Name Comparison
We investigated how the SNs change the image’s name and if the same
image receives different names if shared on different user profiles. The name of
the uploaded images was in the following format: 20161028 085447. Out of all
SNs, Google+ does not change the original name even when the same image is
shared on two different profiles. All remaining SNs use a specific encoding for
the image’s name, as shown in Table 3 (the name of the Viber file is quite long,
so the variable part of 65 characters is defined with the regex [a-z0-9]{65}).
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Table 3: Name format of the downloaded image. The original uploaded name was same for
all SNs.
Social Networks Downloaded image name
Facebook 14633305 13935419006590 2203780186632661 o
Flickr 30319899670 77e6fd4bed o
Google+ unchanged
Instagram 14533468 7761667291914 4275777725718855 n
LinkedIn 9f86293d-bdaf-4bce-b5ce-c5610e2cd9b8-original
Pinterest 2ecd9963cac22479edbd03d65b43dd2a
Telegram IMG 20171029 184428
Tumblr tumblr ofswzjXl7K1vjbnv5o1 1280
Twitter Cv3ahPvXEAAo6CR.jpg-large
Viber image-0-02-05-[a-z0-9]{65}-V
VK 0ysdRR9cIVc
WeChat mmexport1477761254890
WhatsApp IMG-20171029-WA0019
Instagram uses the same name format of Facebook, while WhatsApp uses
a different one even though they both belong to Facebook. In some cases, like
Telegram and WhatsApp, the name is created by using the downloading date
and time. The Pinterest name format is the most interesting. The original
name is not preserved and the image receives the same name when shared on
different profiles, irrespective of the resolution class. This means that the name
might be a good candidate for watermarking the images, however, it is quite
short and the watermark could be easily removed or changed.
5.2.2. Full Comparison
For this comparison, we used the SHA-1 algorithm to check if the integrity
of the original image was preserved. If SHA-1 produces different digests, then
it means that the same input image has undergone a few changes during the
uploading and downloading process.
In Table 4, we provide collective results for all the resolution classes. The
term “All differ” (or “All equals”) means that for a given SN and a given test
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Table 4: The SHA-1 results for both the original and shared images and the shared images
on different profiles. All the resolution classes are grouped together.
Social Networks Original vs Shared Shared P1 vs Shared P2
Facebook All differ All differ
Flickr All equals All equals
Google+ All equals All equals
Instagram All differ All equals
LinkedIn All differ All differ
Pinterest All differ All equals
Telegram All differ All equals
Tumblr All differ All equals
Twitter All differ All equals
Viber All differ All equals
VK All differ All equals
WeChat All differ All equals
WhatsApp All differ All equals
case we obtain different (or the same) results in all classes. The “Original vs
Shared” column is consistent with the results in Table 2. The SHA-1 algorithm
produces equal digests only for the two SNs that do not apply any compression,
namely Flickr and Google+. Moreover, it means that even the metadata is not
changed during the sharing process. The compression applied by the other SNs
changes the images, thus the produced digests are different among original and
shared ones.
The most interesting results were obtained for Facebook and LinkedIn in “Shared
P1 vs Shared P2” case. The two SNs return different digests for all resolution
classes when the images are shared on different profiles. With the next two
comparisons, we will go more deeply to investigate if Facebook’s and LinkedIn’s
unusual results are due to content or metadata changes.
5.2.3. Content Comparison
In this test, we compared images through a bit by bit different operation.
Only if the two images have the same content the difference produces a full-zero
17
Table 5: The bit by bit results for both the original and shared images and the shared images
on different profiles. All the resolution classes are grouped together.
Social Networks Original vs Shared Shared P1 vs Shared P2
Facebook All differ All equals
Flickr All equals All equals
Google+ All equals All equals
Instagram All differ All equals
LinkedIn All differ All equals
Pinterest All differ All equals
Telegram All differ All equals
Tumblr All differ All equals
Twitter All differ All equals
Viber All differ All equals
VK All differ All equals
WeChat All differ All equals
WhatsApp All differ All equals
matrix. The content comparison narrows the field to the pixels’ value excluding
the metadata. Grouped results for all the resolution classes are shown in Table
5.
The “Original vs Shared” results are consistent with the results in Table 2.
If the SN does not apply any compression, such as Flickr and Google+, the
content of the original image matches bit by bit with the content of the shared
one, while the compression of the other SNs has its obvious effects on bit-level.
Moreover, we used an open-source framework [64] to test different algorithms to
detect double JPG compression. The results showed no evidence of watermark
based on double JPG compression. In “Shared P1 vs Shared P2” case, we have
our first important result. Since in all SNs the image shared on P1 matches bit
by bit with the same image shared on P2, we can infer that all the selected SNs
do not apply any watermark into images’ content [13].
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5.2.4. Metadata Comparison
Metadata summarizes basic information about the associated file. Exif stan-
dard defines the metadata attributes for digital images [65]. The full attributes
list can be categorized in: date and time information, static and dynamic camera
settings, general descriptions, copyright information, and the thumbnail (i.e., a
smaller version of the image for indexing and previewing).
The metadata comparison produced exactly the same full comparison results
as in Table 4. The analysis of each single attributes list for each SN gave rise
to some interesting results.
Flickr and Google+ preserve all the original attributes list, whereas, Twitter
erases all of them. Tumblr removes only the thumbnails related fields, while all
remaining SNs (i.e., Instagram, Pinterest, Telegram, Viber, VK, WeChat, and
WhatsApp) preserve only a few subsets of the original attributes list concerning
general descriptions and static camera settings. In most of the cases, this subset
does not include any GPS information. However, in all these SNs the attributes
list is the same when the same image is shared on two different profiles.
We performed further investigations on LinkedIn and Facebook as the meta-
data changes when the same image is shared through different user profiles.
In particular, LinkedIn uses the subset of the same attributes of the previous
SNs and changes some non-significant attributes, like “Exif Byte Order” and
the “Resolution Unit”. However, these changes can not be related to a water-
mark since they do not produce a unique identifier, but rather a standard string
for those attributes. In comparison to LinkedIn, Facebook, substitutes a set
of attributes by using the Information Interchange Model (IIM), that is a set
of metadata attributes defined by the International Press Telecommunications
Council (IPTC). Three of the new attributes, “Special Instructions”, “Cur-
rent IPTC Digest” and “Original Transmission Reference” receive very unusual
values, that is three alphanumeric-characters codes. Moreover, the “Special In-
structions” does not change if the same image is shared on two different profiles,
as the other two are strictly related to the user profile that shares the image.
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According to the standard, the “Special Instructions” is a text field that can
include special restrictions, additional permissions, and credits required when
publishing. The “Current IPTC Digest” is the hash digest of the other IPTC
data. Finally, “Original Transmission Reference” is typically used to improve
the transmission and routing purposes of the image. Facebook does not release
any details about these fields’ encoding. Even if the last two fields change when
the same image is shared on different profiles, we can not claim that they are
used for watermarking purposes.
In order to investigate the Facebook metadata case, we performed some ad-
ditional tests. In particular, we wanted to study the following three crucial
aspects:
• Time test - The images were uploaded and downloaded twice on the same
profile, after a certain time. The aim was to determine whether the meta-
data was time-dependent.
• Sharing test - The aim was to determine whether the metadata changed
when the image was shared across profiles. In practice, the images were
uploaded on profile P1 and downloaded three times: from P1, from P2
that had visited P1, and from P2 that had shared the images on his/her
wall (i.e., the web page where others users, like friends and fans, can post
their thoughts, images and video). The aim was to determine whether the
metadata was sharing-dependent
• Location test - CDN provides digital content from locations closer to the
user. Since it is unknown which node of the CDN serves our request,
we used a VPN to repeat sharing test forcing one of the two profiles to
be located in the following countries: Russia, China, United States and
United Kingdom. The aim was to determine whether the metadata was
location-dependent.
In all these three new tests, the previous name comparison, full comparison,
and content comparison produced the same results. The metadata comparison
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outcome was much more interesting. The attributes list was the same as the
previous test, but the three new fields “Special Instructions”, “Current IPTC
Digest”, and “Original Transmission Reference” had different behaviour. In
time test, the “Special Instructions” was the same even after 24 hours, as “Cur-
rent IPTC Digest” and “Original Transmission Reference” received different
values just after few seconds. In sharing test and location test all the three
attributes preserved the same values. This means that the metadata is surely
profile-dependent and time-dependent, but not sharing and location dependent.
At the time of writing, the social network watermarking test reveals that
none of the selected SNs applies any profile-dependent watermark visible out-
side the network. Facebook introduces some suspicious values in three new
attributes. However, the metadata can be easily erased or modified and can-
not be considered a good solution for authorship attribution and verification
purpose.
6. User Explicit Watermarking
In this section, we present the results of some conventional image water-
marking techniques on SNs we considered in our study. The goal is to figure
out if these approaches can reliably be used on SNs for marking the images to
be uploaded. In order to carry out our tests, we selected several free invisible
watermarking algorithms. We performed our analysis on the set of SNs and
images described in Section 4.
There are a number of watermarking tools, however, we selected open-source
or freeware tools that work with the image file formats accepted by SNs (i.e.,
jpg and png). These tools can be categorized into spatial and transform domain
watermarking algorithms. The first category includes easy to implement and
low complexity methods. On the flip side, these watermarking tools present
weaknesses like weak robustness and low security. The methods in transform
domain watermarking class are widely applied and they can reach a good balance
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between robustness and imperceptibility. For our tests we selected the following
thirteen algorithms:
A1) BlindHide replaces the least significant bits (LSB) of each pixel with the
watermark [66].
A2) HideSeek tries to get around the security issues in BlindHide by distribut-
ing the watermark across the image with a different pixel order [66].
A3) FilterFirst adopts an edge-detecting filter (Laplace) to check the area with
value-homogeneous pixels [66].
A4) BattleSteg is based on the Battleships game and identifies the best area
of the image to embed the watermark [66].
A5) Dynamic FilterFirst improves the FilerFirst by using dynamic program-
ming [66].
A6) Dynamic BattleSteg, like the Dynamic FilterFirst, uses dynamic program-
ming to improve BattleSteg [66].
A7) F5 implements matrix encoding during the JPEG compression process
[67].
A8) OpenPuff applies multiple layers of protection and data decorrelation in
order to embed the watermark [68].
A9) OpenStego implements Dugad’s algorithm [69], a wavelet-based method,
for watermarking the image [70].
A10) Secretbook is specifically designed for performing steganography on Face-
book by exploiting the quality factor and the quantisation matrix [71].
A11) SilentEye combines LSB and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) tech-
nique to hide the watermark [72].
A12) SteganPEG performs data compression and decompression before water-
marking the image [73].
22
A13) Steghide uses a graph-theoretic algorithm to find pairs of positions of the
image to be swapped in order to embed the watermark [74].
Table 6 shows the results of the watermark extraction process for each resolu-
tion class respectively. In particular, we denote with a grey cell if the extraction
process successfully retrieved the original watermark from the downloaded im-
ages. SilentEye and Steghide are not able to embed the watermark with large
images and SteganPEG returns “image capacity exceeded” error with small im-
ages. For these reasons, we consider these 3 algorithms as a failure. Since Flickr
and Google+ do not apply any compression, the watermark is preserved for each
watermarking algorithm and resolution class. None of the selected methods is
able to create a robust watermark that can successfully pass through Instagram
and LinkedIn. Experiments also revealed that spatial domain based water-
marking methods, like BlindHide, HideSeek, FilterFirst, BattleSteg, Dynamic
FilterFirst, Dynamic BattleSteg and SteganPEG are too weak to be applied
to shared images on SNs. The other methods, like F5, OpenPuff, SecretBook
and SilentEye, obtain better results with standard and small images. However,
SilentEye heavily transforms the image that appears visually modified and de-
graded to the user. Figure 2 shows the effects of SilentEye algorithm. The
Table 6: The watermark extraction results for each selected algorithms for all SNs. The
success of the extraction process is shown with a grey cell following this sequence standard,
large (4128×2322), and small (640×480) resolution images.
SNs A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13
Facebook
Flickr
Google+
Instagram
LinkedIn
Pinterest
Telegram
Tumblr
Twitter
Viber
VK
WeChat
WhatsApp
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Figure 2: The original image portion on the left, the portion of the SilentEye outcome in the
middle, and the same SilentEye outcome with red circles highlighting artefacts on the right.
watermarked image is affected by a diffuse noise if compared with the original
one. We highlighted the vertical artefacts on the right-hand side with red circles.
The same artefacts can be found in the middle portion of the image.
Based on findings in user explicit watermarking test, transform domain wa-
termarking methods are a good candidate to apply a personal watermark to the
images to be shared on SNs. However, as shown in Table 6, there is not a single
watermarking technique that can be successfully used across all SNs. Moreover,
the user has to act consciously to embed a watermark into his/her personal
photos. However, this is less likely to happen in scenarios of instant picture
sharing through mobiles on social platforms like Instagram and WhatsApp.
7. User Unaware Watermarking
Smartphones have a big contribution to a large number of images being
shared on SNs [1]. For this reason, in this section, we explore whether the
noise left by the sensor of the smartphone’s camera can be successfully used to
watermark the images being uploaded on SNs.
To perform our investigation, we selected six smartphones from three differ-
ent brands with three pairs of identical models (Table 7). The reason of picking
the identical models was to verify if the test can work across two different phones
of the same models, as identical models mount identical components. For each
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device, we considered both the front and rear camera that usually present differ-
ent characteristics in term of sensor, quality, and resolution. The iPhone 6 and
iPhone 6 Plus both have an identical front and rear camera. For each camera of
each device, we took 700 photos. In total the dataset consists of 8,400 images 1.
Then for each camera, we kept a subset of 50 original images and we uploaded
and downloaded 50 images on each of the 13 SNs in Table 1.
Table 7: The six smartphones used for the user unaware watermarking tests and the pixel
resolution of the front and rear cameras.
ID Brand Model Front Camera Rear Camera
1 Apple iPhone 6 1280×960 3264×2448
2 Apple iPhone 6 Plus 1280×960 3264×2448
3 LG Nexus 5 1280×960 3264×2448
4 LG Nexus 5 1280×960 3264×2448
5 Samsung Galaxy S2 1600×1200 3264×2448
6 Samsung Galaxy S2 1600×1200 3264×2448
Firstly, we provide a small background in image processing, and then we
describe our methodology on original images. Next, we discuss the results of
three different tests that is profile attribution, intra-layer user profiles linking,
and inter-layer user profiles linking (see Section 1.2) on the downloaded images.
7.1. User Unaware Watermarking through PRNU
The unavoidable noise that affects any image can be categorised into shot
noise and pattern noise. The first one is introduced due to external factors such
as brightness, temperature and humidity; the second component is regular and
systematic. We exploit a PRNU-based method [43] to extract the dominant
part of the pattern noise and define this noise as the user unaware watermark.
In order to extract the noise, we tested several different algorithms, like
Diffusion Anisotropic [75], Diffusion Isotropic [76], Block Matching 3D (BM3D)
[77], Wavelet Soft Threshold [78], Wavelet Hard Threshold [79], and Wavelet
1The dataset is available from http://smartdata.cs.unibo.it/datasets#images
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Multi Frame [80]. The BM3D approach provided the best results, especially
combined with the Y channel of the images, that is the luminance component
in YCbCr colour space format. The fingerprint FPi of the smartphone camera
i was approximated as the average of residual PRNUs of n pictures captured by
that device:
FPi =
1
n
n∑
j=1
BM3D(Y (Ij)) (1)
where the function Y () extracts the Y channel and BM3D() extracts the PRNU,
and the resultant FPi is a matrix as big as the original image. In order to
evaluate if a generic image Ik had been taken by the same camera, the standard
normalized correlation was applied between the PRNU (Nk) extracted from Ik
and the fingerprint FPi:
corr(Nk, FPi) =
(Nk −Nk)(FPi − FPi)
‖(Nk −Nk)‖‖(FPi − FPi)‖
(2)
where Nk is equal to BM3D(Y (Ik)), and Nk and FPi are scalars that represent
the mean value of Nk and FPi matrices. The correlation value can vary from 0
(different source) to 1 (same source). In order to correlate images with different
sizes, large images were scaled to the small one.
Figure 3 shows the results using the methodology described above on original
images. The graphs in the first two rows represent the front cameras of each
device, while those in the second two rows represent the rear cameras. For each
smartphone’s camera in Table 7, we used a training set of 33 images (two-
thirds) to define FP , and a test set of 17 images (one-thirds) to compose the
set of images to be correlated. In accordance with [81], using a training set of
20 is enough to obtain good results. Each graph represents the values obtained
by correlating a specific FPi with all the images in the 12 test sets. High values
were achieved when the FPi and the test set come from the same source (green
dots). All obtained correlation values were in the range from 0 to 0.1. However,
a heuristic threshold of 0.011 (purple horizontal line) that maximises both the
whole positive and negative predictive values allowed to correctly classify all the
images, in line with previous evidence [46]. In the subsequent subsections, we
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
(j) (k) (l)
Figure 3: Correlation results for each of the twelve fingerprints, six for the front cameras (first
and second rows) and six for the rear cameras (third and fourth rows). XF and XR identify
the front and the rear camera of the smartphone X, respectively.
discuss the results of our three experiments (e.g., profile attribution, intra-layer
and inter-layer user profiles linking) on the images downloaded from all the 13
SNs.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
(j) (k) (l)
Figure 4: Profile attribution results. Each graph groups the results of a single source on all
thirteen SNs, six for the front cameras (first and second rows) and six for the rear cameras
(third and fourth rows). The number of images in each cell is identified through a white-to-blue
scale, from 0 (white) to 17 (blue).
7.2. Profile Attribution
Profile attribution task allows us to verify through which smartphone the
user has taken and uploaded the images on a SN (see case (a) in Figure 1). For
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this test, for each SN in Table 1 and for each smartphone’s camera in Table 7, we
also used a training set of 33 original images and a test set of 17 downloaded
images. This means that we obtained thirteen graphs for each smartphone’s
camera, one for each SN, that look like as a single graph in Figure 3. In this
case, in order to define the threshold that allows to classify the images we used
a simple generalized linear model.
Figure 4 shows the profile attribution results for each smartphone’s camera,
results for the front cameras are in the first two rows and for the rear cameras
are in the second two rows. In particular, each row in each graph represents the
classification results for a specific SN and each white-to-blue scale cell identifies
the 17 images of test set assigned to the source camera in that SN, from 0
(white) to 17 (blue). This aggregation allows to highlight the user unaware
watermarking capability of each smartphone’s camera in each SN. If all the
images are correctly assigned, in each graph we see an intense blue column
corresponding to the right source and no other “switched on” cells out of that
column. The results show that for all source cameras in each SN, the fingerprint
FP allows to correctly classify almost all the 17 downloaded images. Moreover,
the erroneously assigned images do not compromise the identification of the
source since only in 5 graphs out of 12, that is (a), (b), (g), (i) and (l), we can
see very few images wrongly assigned to the right source.
7.3. Intra-layer User Profiles Linking
In this section, we discuss results in the context of intra-layer user profiles
linking that is the task to identify if a set of images from two different user
profiles within the same SN belong to the same user (see case (b) in Figure 1).
For this reason, both the training set (33 downloaded images) and the test
set (17 downloaded images) were taken from the same SN. Thus, we obtained
thirteen graphs (one for each SN) for each smartphone’s camera, and we used
again a generalized linear model for the classification process.
Figure 5 shows the intra-layer user profiles linking performances for each
smartphone’s camera, front cameras are in the first two rows and rear cameras
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
(j) (k) (l)
Figure 5: Intra-layer user profiles linking results. Each graph groups the results of a single
source on all thirteen SNs, six for the front cameras (first and second rows) and six for the
rear cameras (second and third rows). The number of images in each cell is identified through
a white-to-blue scale, from 0 (white) to 17 (blue).
are in the second two rows. In particular, each row in each graph represents the
classification results for a specific SN and each white-to-blue scale cell identifies
the images assigned to the source camera in that SN, from 0 (white) to 17 (blue).
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The results show that for each front source camera, the fingerprint FP allows
to correctly classify almost all the 17 downloaded images in each SN. WeChat
(penultimate row from the top in each graph) returns worst results for the rear
cameras. This is probably because WeChat provides a high compression level
with large images, as shown in Table 2. However, in all the graphs we see a
well-defined blue column corresponding to the right source.
7.4. Inter-layer User Profiles Linking
Inter-layer user profiles linking is the most challenging task and allows to
verify if two sets of images from different user profiles on different SNs belong
to the same user (see case (c) in Figure 1). Since the combination of all SNs
produces a very large set of results (i.e., 12 graphs for each SN for each cam-
era), we selected a representative subset of SNs composed of Facebook (SN01),
Instagram (SN04), Telegram (SN07), and WhatsApp (SN13). In this case, the
training set of 33 downloaded images and the test set of 17 downloaded im-
ages were selected from different SNs among the selected ones. For instance,
while we used 33 images from Facebook to define the fingerprint FP , all the
17-images test sets were selected from Instagram. In this test, we also used a
generalized linear model for the classification process.
The combination of all the selected SNs produced the results shown in Figure
6, front cameras are in the first two rows and rear cameras are in the second two
rows. Each graph represents the inter-layer user profiles linking performances
for a given source camera. In particular, in each graph, each group of 3 rows
from top to bottom represents the results using the fingerprint from a specific
SNs (i.e., Facebook for the first three rows, Instagram for the second three rows,
Telegram for the third three rows, and WhatsApp for the last three rows). The
results show a slight worsening in comparison to intra-layer user profiles linking,
however, the number of misclassified images is very low. The problem is par-
ticularly significant when the Instagram images are involved in the comparison.
In fact, the worst results occurred both when the fingerprint was defined with
Instagram’s images (i.e., the second group of three rows from the top) as well as
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
(j) (k) (l)
Figure 6: Inter-layer user profiles linking results. Each graph groups the results of a single
source on all thirteen SNs, six for the front cameras (first and second rows) and six for the
rear cameras (third and fourth rows). The number of images in each cell is identified through
a white-to-blue scale, from 0 (white) to 17 (blue).
when we tried to classify the Instagram’s images (i.e., the first row in the first
group of three rows and the second row in the third and fourth group of three
rows). However, all the other SNs combinations that do not involve Instagram’s
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images obtained good results, especially with front images.
The results show the effectiveness of the PRNU-based method in the task of
defining a user unaware watermarking for all the considered SNs. It is robust
enough in spite of the use of the shared images degraded by SNs during the
uploading and downloading process. Our results indicate that the proposed
method can be successfully used both for the profile attribution and for the
intra/inter-layer user profiles linking. Moreover, the method makes it possible
to identify those profiles that belong to the same user, for instance like fake
profiles.
8. Conclusions
An increasingly large amount of data is loaded daily and shared on SNs and
the majority of this flow of data includes images. Thus it is important to find
solutions for authorship attribution and verification of these pictures to avoid
problems like impersonating or fake profiles.
We trod multiple investigations in the domain of the image watermarking.
All the experiments we conducted in the context of social networks watermarking
showed no evidence of watermarks. Facebook introduces some suspicious values
in images’ metadata that actually can not be considered a robust watermark in
SNs context.
Next, we conducted a detailed review of how conventional image water-
marking algorithms (user explicit watermarking) behave on each selected SN.
In particular, we examined whether they can resist the compression algorithms
applied by social platforms. In this case, we found that none of the algorithms is
able to apply a robust watermark that retains in all the 13 selected SNs. More-
over, in some cases, these watermarking algorithms visually altered the original
image.
Finally, we showed that a user unaware watermark based on PRNU is able
to resist the compression algorithms of all the 13 SNs investigated in our study.
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The PRNU is a regular and systematic noise component characterizing each
image captured by off-the-shelf cameras (including the smartphone’s camera).
We also proved that the method based on this unawarely trace allows to perform
several challenging tasks, that is profile attribution, intra and inter-layer user
profile linking. Moreover, we showed how the user unaware watermark can be
exploited for fake profiles detection, that is a corollary of the three previous
tasks.
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